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Government Takings and Constitutional Guarantees: 
When Date of Valuation Statutes Deny Just 
Compensation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the oldest case of a government’s exercise of eminent 
domain is recorded in the Bible.1 King Ahab, ruler in Israel, saw and 
desired to possess Naboth’s vineyard, a fertile plot of land located 
near Ahab’s home.2 Ahab, not necessarily disposed to tyrannically 
expropriating his subjects’ property, offered Naboth another 
vineyard or money for the property.3 Naboth refused, for which he 
was ultimately stoned to death.4 Ahab gained his desire and even 
apparently avoided paying compensation.5 
Today, the effects of exercising the eminent domain right are 
much less severe for landowners than in Naboth’s case. Federal and 
state governments in the United States may exercise the right only to 
take land for a “public use” and only if they also compensate the 
landowners for the value of the condemned6 property. Compensa-
 
 1. See CARMAN F. RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED 
STATES § 4 (photo. reprint 1991) (1894). 
 2. 1 Kings 21:1–2 (King James). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 21:3–4, :13–14. Naboth refused to sell because to do so would have violated 
his religious law; he said to Ahab, “The Lord forbid it me, that I should give the inheritance of 
my fathers unto thee.” Id. at 21:3; see also Deuteronomy 19:14 (King James). 
Naboth’s stoning was effected through two false witnesses. 1Kings 21:11–13. After 
Ahab learned that Naboth would not sell, he returned home sulking and complaining. Id. at 
21:4. When Ahab’s wife Jezebel discovered what was wrong, she responded, likely exclaiming 
to her husband, “Dost thou now govern the kingdom of Israel?” Id. at 21:7. Jezebel 
immediately set about devising Naboth’s death. See id. at 21:7–10. She wrote letters in Ahab’s 
name to local officials who arranged for two witnesses to testify that Naboth had blasphemed 
God and the king. Id. at 21:8–14. The penalty for such a crime was death by stoning. See id. at 
21:13; Leviticus 24:16 (King James). 
 5. Ahab actually paid sorely for his taking. As he went to possess Naboth’s vineyard, he 
encountered Elijah, a prophet, who cursed him for killing Naboth and possessing his 
inheritance. 1 Kings 21:17–29. 
 6. Often, the concepts “eminent domain” and “land condemnation” are used 
interchangeably, though they are clearly distinct. While “eminent domain” is the right of the 
government to take land, denoting an inherent capacity, “land condemnation” is the act of 
taking the land. See J.D. EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 13 (2d ed. 1995). 
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tion—or “just compensation,” as it appears in the United States 
Constitution7—requires that the landowner be put in the position he 
or she would have occupied had the government not taken the land.8 
While this notion of just compensation has not always accompanied 
the eminent domain right,9 it is difficult to imagine a just scheme 
today that fails to compensate landowners for government takings.10 
In any event, the Constitution requires it. 
Despite the need for providing just compensation, determining 
the proper amount in individual cases has presented a significant 
challenge to courts and legislatures. The challenge arises in part 
because land values change over time, and so, in order to make a 
present value determination, a court or a legislature must set a date 
on which to value the property. In a majority of states, this valuation 
date is set by statute. Unfortunately, these valuation date statutes can 
become controversial when a significant time period passes between 
the valuation date and the time the government actually takes the 
land if the land’s value materially changes during that period. If the 
land value increases significantly, then paying the landowner the 
amount determined on the date of valuation is not adequate 
compensation, and the date of valuation statute fails to provide the 
constitutionally required just compensation. 
Notwithstanding the constitutional importance of this valuation 
problem, the principle of just compensation and its related valuation 
date issue have not been dominant themes in eminent domain 
jurisprudence. In fact, since the Supreme Court’s 1922 decision in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,11 the topic of regulatory takings—
takings effected by government regulation rather than through direct 
action against landowners—has commanded the majority of atten-
 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
 8. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 9. See EATON, supra note 6, at 14; see also infra Part II.A. 
 10. This assertion is not to say that the government can never take property without 
compensating the owner. The police, war, and tax powers all permit the government to take 
private property without compensation, but these powers are theoretically distinct from the 
eminent domain right. See RANDOLPH, supra note 1, §§ 8–25. 
 11. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Pennsylvania Coal represented a significant turn in takings 
jurisprudence. For the first time, the Supreme Court ruled that a government-imposed 
regulation could actually constitute a taking of private property for public use. See id. at 414–
16. Consequently, the landowner in Pennsylvania Coal had a right to compensation for the 
damages suffered as a result of the regulation. See id. at 415–16. 
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tion when courts and academics have examined eminent domain 
jurisprudence.12 This attention likely arises from the difficulties 
associated with determining when a government regulation is 
actually a taking of private property for public use—there is much 
room for debate. Nevertheless, within the realm of direct land 
condemnation, valuation date law has been more quietly developing, 
and the application of various valuation date statutes in recent years 
has imbued the topic with renewed vigor.13 
This Comment outlines the parameters of the valuation date 
problem, which often pits statutory provisions against state and 
federal constitutional mandates. Part II provides insight into the 
valuation date problem by laying out historical eminent domain 
underpinnings and a just compensation framework. It also discusses 
each of the fifty states’ varying statutory positions (or lack of 
positions) on dates of valuation.14 Part III examines the date of 
valuation problem, as well as the related takings date problem and 
summarizes several leading judicial responses to conflict between 
statutory dates of valuation and the constitutional just compensation 
requirement. Before a brief conclusion in Part V, Part IV tracks 
possible legislative reactions to the date of valuation problem. 
Ultimately, this Comment suggests guidelines for providing just 
compensation when a date of valuation statute fails to meet the 
constitutional mandate. 
 
 12. See Nicholas Mercuro, The Takings Issue: A Continuing Dilemma in Law and 
Economics, in TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION: LAW AND ECONOMICS 
PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINGS ISSUE 1, 1–6 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992), for a discussion 
that characterizes the problem of determining when government regulation becomes a taking 
as the takings issue. 
Because of its scope, this Comment will not include much discussion of the regulatory 
takings issue. There is, however, a wealth of literature on the topic as it continues to demand 
the attention of some of the nation’s leading scholars. See, e.g., TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS 
ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002); 1 THOMAS J. 
MICELI & KATHLEEN SEGERSON, THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS: 
COMPENSATION FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1996); TAKING 
PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992). 
 13. For examples of recent state cases dealing with these statutes, see infra Part III.B.2. 
 14. This Comment focuses on statutory valuation date standards. Necessarily, every state 
has articulated some kind of valuation date standard; slightly more than half have done so 
through statute. See infra app. Other states use judicially-created standards, which are already 
well documented in treatise material. See, e.g., 5 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 18.16 (3d ed. 2001); 11A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS § 32.97 (3d ed. 2000). 
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II. EMINENT DOMAIN, JUST COMPENSATION, AND  
VALUATION DATE STATUTES 
Date of valuation statutes have grown out of an administrative 
need for states to define procedures that govern the exercise of the 
eminent domain right. Despite this administrative need, however, 
state eminent domain procedures ultimately must abide by the 
theoretical underpinnings of the eminent domain right and the 
principle of just compensation. This Part of the Comment describes 
these underpinnings and provides a context in which to view the 
valuation date problem described in Part III. Section A speaks in 
general terms about the history of the eminent domain right and the 
constitutional principle of just compensation, and section B focuses 
on the states’ varied statutory approaches to valuation date 
determination. 
A. Historical and Constitutional Framework for the Government’s 
Eminent Domain Right 
The right of eminent domain inheres in the power of a 
sovereign.15 Importantly, eminent domain is a right, not actual 
control or ownership, and until the government exercises the right, 
the government cannot properly use the private property of 
individuals16 unless operating under the police, war, or taxation 
powers. Because governments have the eminent domain right by 
virtue of being the government, a constitution cannot technically 
grant this power,17 though it can limit the power as exercised. 
Consequently, the United States Constitution and almost all state 
constitutions include provisions that relate to this governmental 
power.18 
 
 15. See RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 3 (“There must be a common basis for federal and 
state eminent domain, and it is found in sovereignty pure and simple.”). 
 16. See id. § 2. The original Latin term “dominium eminens” has become our modern-
day “eminent domain.” See id. Randolph explains that the translation of the term “dominium” 
into “domain,” which signifies the right to control a thing, rather than “dominion,” which 
signifies a thing controlled, emphasizes the term’s precise meaning. Id. 
 17. See EATON, supra note 6, at 14. 
 18. See Sidney Z. Searles, The Law of Eminent Domain in the U.S.A., A.L.I.-A.B.A. 
COURSE OF STUDY: EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND VALUATION LITIGATION 333, 335–36 
(1995). The only exception is North Carolina, which has a statutory eminent domain scheme 
that limits the government’s eminent domain right. Id. 
BAU-FIN 2/15/2003 3:43 PM 
265] When Date of Valuation Statutes Deny 
 269 
A brief historical sketch of the nature and extent of the eminent 
domain right is helpful to understanding its constitutional impact. 
While the ultimate origin of the concept of eminent domain is 
unknown,19 the right has found expression in a variety of bygone 
cultures, including the ancient Greek and Roman societies20 and the 
English feudal order, in which sovereign lords could effectively take 
land they desired without compensating those who previously used 
it.21 The earliest use of the term “eminent domain” was probably in 
the seventeenth century writings of Hugo Grotius, who stated that 
“the property of subjects under the law of eminent domain belongs 
to the state, so that the state, or the person who represents the state, 
can make use of that property, can even destroy or alienate it . . . 
whenever it is to the public advantage.”22 The first formal declaration 
of the related just compensation principle occurred in France’s 1789 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen: “Property 
being an inviolable and sacred right, no one can be deprived of it 
unless the public necessity plainly demands it, and upon condition of 
a just and previous indemnity.”23 
In the latter end of the eighteenth century, certain philosophical 
views came to bear not only on those who drafted France’s 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, but also on the Framers of the 
United States Constitution. Chiefly, John Locke’s writings 
influenced the Founders’ views on private property and their 
intention that the Constitution protect private property rights.24 
Locke emphasized that individual labor created property rights.25 
Commenting on the power of eminent domain (though not 
 
 19. EATON, supra note 6, at 14. 
 20. See RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 4; see also Searles, supra note 18, at 335 (citing 
CORNELIUS TACITUS, THE ANNALS OF TACITUS (Encyclopedia Britannica 1952)). 
 21. See RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 5; Searles, supra note 18, at 335. 
 22. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 402 (Louise R. Loomis trans., 
Walter J. Black, Inc. 1949) (1625); see also RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 5; Searles, supra note 
18, at 335. 
 23. RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 6 (quoting DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN, 
art. XVI (1789)). 
 24. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 16 (1985). 
 25. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT paras. 27–32, at 17–
20 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., The Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690) (“[E]very man has a 
property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The labor of his body 
and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his . . . . As much land as a man tills, 
plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property.”). 
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explicitly calling it so), Locke said, “[T]he supreme power cannot 
take from any man part of his property without his own 
consent . . . .”26 Indeed, in Locke’s view, the purpose of a 
government’s existence is to preserve private property,27 and he 
would condition a government’s exercise of the eminent domain 
right on the consent of the governed.28 Some commentators suggest 
that Locke’s “consent” is a flaw in his theory, even though he later 
explains that it is “tacit consent” in the representative democracy.29 
To make Locke’s theory viable, one commentator concluded that 
the idea of consent must be replaced with “just compensation.”30 In 
any event, the influence of Locke’s emphasis on private property is 
evident in the Framers’ efforts to protect this individual right 
through the Bill of Rights.31 
 
 26. Id. para. 138. To some degree, Locke thought that this power to prevent a taking 
without consent is the very essence of property: “[Individuals] have such right to the goods 
which by the law of the community are theirs, that nobody has a right to take their substance 
or any part of it from them without their own consent; without this, they have no property at 
all . . . .” Id. 
 27. Id. Locke explains: 
[F]or the preservation of property being the end of government and that for which 
men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the people should 
have property; without which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering into 
society, which was the end for which they entered into it—too gross an absurdity for 
any man to own. 
Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. para. 164. 
 30. See EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 14–15 (“The categorical command that property 
shall not be taken without tacit consent must therefore be rewritten to provide that property 
may be taken upon provision of just compensation.”). 
 31. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 7–18. Professor 
Epstein discusses in detail the influence that the modern philosophers Thomas Hobbes and 
John Locke had on the Constitution’s formation. In reference to Locke’s influence, Epstein 
writes: 
The Lockean system was dominant at the time when the Constitution was adopted. 
His theory of the state was adopted in Blackstone’s Commentaries, and the 
protection of property against its enemies was a central and recurrent feature of the 
political thought of the day. Although protection of private property was a central 
objective of the original constitutional scheme, the Constitution was not one 
eminent domain clause writ large . . . . At every turn the constitutional concern is 
with preventing the concentration of power in a few hands . . . . Within the 
[Constitution’s] original framework the rich array of procedural and jurisdictional 
protections was expected to serve some substantive end. And that end was, of 
course, the protection of private property, of “lives, liberties, and estates” that Locke 
considered the purpose of government. The procedural safeguards worked to 
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Today, every level of government in the United States may 
exercise the right of eminent domain: from the federal government, 
to states, to counties, to cities, and even to local government 
subdivisions.32 As noted, this right inheres in the sovereign’s power, 
so it should come as no surprise that there is no mention of the 
eminent domain right in the original articles of the United States 
Constitution and no clear expression of it in any of the 
Constitution’s amendments. In fact, the federal government’s 
eminent domain right was not explicitly recognized by a branch of 
the government until the Supreme Court decided Kohl v. United 
States33 in 1875. True, the eminent domain right is implied by the 
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, but this recognition came as a 
protection of an individual liberty, rather than as a grant of 
governmental power. The source of the eminent domain right is 
sovereignty. 
The Fifth Amendment’s language—“nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation” 34— dictates two 
limitations on exercising the eminent domain right. First, the “public 
use” limitation prohibits the federal government from taking land for 
any private advantage. It is a term that courts today interpret very 
broadly, permitting an array of government objectives under the 
cover of eminent domain exercise.35 The second limitation, which is 
 
guarantee by indirection that the government would not pass laws that encroached 
upon the property rights that government was designed to protect. 
Id. at 16–17 (citations omitted). Focusing on the Bill of Rights, Epstein continues: 
The Bill [of Rights] identifies the ends of government, the rights that the system of 
limited jurisdiction, indirect voting, and separation of powers is designed to protect. 
Here the brute fact of federalism complicates the application of political theory, for 
the Bill of Rights functioned originally as a limitation upon the federal government 
and not upon the power of the states, a point which was explicitly and correctly held 
by Justice Marshall for a unanimous court in Barron v. Baltimore. Limitations upon 
the powers of the state have been answered in practice by incorporating specific 
protections for individuals against the state as well, including the eminent domain 
clause. 
Id. at 18 (footnotes omitted). 
 32. See Searles, supra note 18, at 336. 
 33. 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875) (“Such an authority [to appropriate land or other property 
in the states] is essential to [the federal government’s] independent existence and 
perpetuity . . . . The powers vested by the Constitution in the general government demand for 
their exercise the acquisition of lands in all the States.”). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 35. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (holding that a 
Hawaii statute breaking up large land holdings held in trusts was a permissible taking for 
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the subject of this Comment, is “just compensation,” and it requires 
the government to pay the landowner a fair amount for any taking.36 
While the eminent domain right is of ancient origin, the 
requirement of just compensation is a more recent historical 
development.37 In fact, as late as the Civil War years, some state 
governments were exercising their eminent domain right without 
paying compensation.38 The Fifth Amendment’s private property 
protections, which include the just compensation requirement, have 
now long applied to all the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
incorporated by Supreme Court case law.39 Additionally, each state 
has its own constitutional or statutory eminent domain laws that 
similarly limit state and local government exercise of the eminent 
domain right.40 All government must compensate landowners when 
taking land. 
Hence, the landowner-friendly compensation principle tempers 
the otherwise harsh power of the government to take an individual’s 
private property. Importantly, the U.S. Constitution and many of 
the state constitutions include the words “just” or “due” with the 
term “compensation.”41 Some commentators assert that the word is 
superfluous,42 but others, including courts, indicate that the term 
 
“public use”); see also Searles, supra note 18, at 342. 
 36. The brief “public use” discussion in this paragraph only fills out the background 
section of the Comment. The focus of this Comment is whether valuation date statutes deny 
just compensation, so “just compensation” necessarily receives more attention. 
 37. See EATON, supra note 6, at 14 (“Many early definitions of eminent domain, 
including those applied in the United States, did not include a provision for just 
compensation.”). The idea of just compensation appeared in the writings of Grotius in 
connection with his expression of the eminent domain right. See GROTIUS, supra note 22, at 
403 (“[T]he state is bound to make good out of the public funds the damage to those who 
have lost what was theirs . . . .”); Searles, supra note 18, at 335. 
 38. See EATON, supra note 6, at 14; see also Lindsay v. Comm’rs, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 
(1796); State v. Dawson, 21 S.C.L. (3 Hill) 100 (1836). 
 39. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405 (1994); Chi., Burlington & Quincy 
R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897). 
 40. See Searles, supra note 18, at 335–36. 
 41. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (“just compensation”); 
IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 18 (“just compensation”); KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 4 (“full 
compensation”); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 2d (“equivalent in money”); see also EATON, supra 
note 6, at 16 (“Terms such as adequate, reasonable, and due are used in some constitutions in 
conjunction with compensation.”). 
 42. See RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 223, at 205–06 (“The word [sic] ‘just,’ ‘full,’ 
‘adequate,’ ‘due,’ or ‘reasonable,’ prefixed to ‘compensation’ in constitution or statute, does 
not carry any definite weight. None of these prefixes can enlarge or restrict the definition of 
property, nor affect the measure of compensation.”); EATON, supra note 6, at 16. 
BAU-FIN 2/15/2003 3:43 PM 
265] When Date of Valuation Statutes Deny 
 273 
“just compensation” shows that compensation must ultimately be 
fair for both the landowner and the government.43 Whatever the 
term “just” adds or does not add to “compensation,” “just 
compensation” may be defined as paying the property owner the 
value—normally the fair market value on the date of valuation—of 
the taken property. The compensation must be paid in money,44 and 
it must include interest for any delay in making payment.45 The “fair 
market value” of a property is “what a willing buyer would pay in 
cash to a willing seller” at the time of valuation.46 
The policy of just compensation is to put the property owner in 
as good a position as he or she would have occupied if the taking 
had not occurred.47 Thus, the government must spread the 
individual landowner’s loss throughout the community, rather than 
force the landowner to contribute more than his or her proper share 
to the public improvement.48 At a more fundamental level, two 
interests support the “same position” policy: fairness and respect for 
 
 43. See, e.g., Searles, supra note 18, at 343 (citing Searl v. Sch. Dist. Number 2 in Lake 
County, 133 U.S. 553 (1890)); Utah State Rd. Comm’n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 830 n.8 
(Utah 1984). 
 44. See Searles, supra note 18, at 343. 
 45. See id. (citing Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933)). 
 46. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (citation omitted). 
The Court went on to explain that the “fair market value” standard of just compensation does 
not generally account for the value an individual owner may place on property, but it is 
nevertheless an administratively necessary standard: 
We have acknowledged that, in some cases, this standard fails fully to indemnify the 
owner for his loss. Particularly when property has some special value to its owner 
because of its adaptability to his particular use, the fair-market-value measure does 
not make the owner whole. We are willing to tolerate such occasional inequity 
because of the difficulty of assessing the value an individual places upon a particular 
piece of property and because of the need for a clear, easily administrable rule 
governing the measure of “just compensation.” 
Id. at 10 n.15. (citations omitted). 
 47. See Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 10; see also Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United 
States, 148 U.S. 312, 336–37 (1893). 
 48. See Saratoga Fire Prot. Dist. v. Hackett, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 701 (Ct. App. 
2002) (quoting L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Continental Dev. Corp., 66 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 630, 644 (1997) and interpreting the just compensation provision of the California 
Constitution). Distributing the loss “throughout the community” entails drawing on public 
funds that the government has already collected or will collect through taxation or other 
assessment. 
Notably, a condemned property’s value may decrease based merely on the 
announcement of the condemnation action. See 5 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 18.16 (3d ed. 
2001); infra note 95. This depreciated value cannot be the compensation provided to the 
owner if the “same position” policy is to be maintained. 
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private property. Some courts have explicitly relied on the interest of 
fairness to hold that a government entity cannot require a landowner 
to surrender property, particularly property on which he or she lives, 
without compensating the owner for the loss. 49 Furthermore, the 
United States has a rich heritage of private property ownership, 
inspired in many ways by the writings of John Locke, 50 so even if the 
Constitution did not require compensation, courts would likely 
enforce this historical respect for property by requiring 
compensation. 
Every state today recognizes the principle of just compensation 
and by some means guarantees it to owners who must surrender 
their property to a condemnor51 for a public use.52 Importantly, and 
without question, the federal Constitution is controlling in all 
jurisdictions. While states may formulate and adopt their own 
procedures for condemnation actions—and all do—the 
constitutional mandate that just compensation be provided must 
obtain in every case. Unfortunately, state laws vary as to their 
application of the just compensation principle, and not all of them 
clearly abide by the Constitution’s compensation mandate. 
Specifically, before a condemnor can award just compensation, it 
must properly determine the compensation amount, which requires 
setting a date of valuation.53 Many states set the valuation date by 
 
 49. See, e.g., Utah State Rd. Comm’n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) (“The 
constitutional requirement of just compensation derives ‘as much content from the basic 
equitable principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of property law . . . .’”). 
In the spirit of fairness, some states go beyond the just compensation requirement by 
devoting code sections to requiring condemning authorities to assist with moving landowners 
displaced by a condemnation proceeding. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4622 (1995); CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 7262 (1995); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1-601A (1997). But see 4A SACKMAN, supra note 
14, § 14A.02[4][c]. 
 50. See supra notes 24–31 and accompanying text. 
 51. Governments may delegate their eminent domain right, and they often do. For 
example, entities such as utilities companies frequently exercise the delegated eminent domain 
right. See Searles, supra note 18, at 336. From this point forward, I will refer to the 
condemning entity as “condemnor,” rather than “government,” since the condemnor might 
not be a government entity. The requirement of just compensation is the same whether the 
condemnor is a government entity or a corporation exercising delegated power. 
 52. See 3 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 8.01 n.14 (listing cases from each of the fifty states 
that adopt the compensation requirement); Searles, supra note 18, at 335–36; see also EATON, 
supra note 6, at 546–48 (chart listing the eminent domain constitutional provisions from each 
state constitution). 
 53. The need for state governments to determine a time of valuation is not novel. See 
RANDOLPH, supra note 1, § 285, at 262. 
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statute, and, perhaps not surprisingly, there are nearly as many 
methods for setting the valuation date as there are states that have 
created legislation on the topic. 
B. Date of Valuation Statutes 
1. State provisions 
Historically, most courts identified the date of taking as the date 
of valuation.54 The rationale behind using this date was that the land 
should be valued at the time that the landowner was entitled to 
receive compensation—that is, at the time that the landowner gave 
up his or her rights to it.55 However, where state condemnation 
procedures do not permit the condemnor to take until after a trier of 
fact56 assesses compensation, it is clear that the valuation date cannot 
 
 54. See id. (citing a series of nineteenth century cases holding that the date of valuation 
is the date of taking, including Tex. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Cella, 42 Ark. 528 (1884); 
Lafayette, Muncie & Bloomington R.R. Co. v. Murdock, 68 Ind. 137 (1879); Chi., Kan. & 
Neb. Ry. Co. v. Broquet, 28 P. 717 (Kan. 1892); Cobb v. City of Boston, 109 Mass. 438 
(1872); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hays, 18 N.W. 51 (Neb. 1883); Stafford v. City of Providence, 
10 R.I. 567 (1873); Tex. & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 60 Tex. 215 (1883)). 
 55. See 3 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 8.05; 11A MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 32.97, 
at 153. An early Massachusetts court opined: 
The true rule would be, as in the case of other purchases, that the price is due and 
ought to be paid, at the moment the purchase is made, when credit is not specially 
agreed on. And if a . . . court could be called on the instant and on the spot, the 
true rule of justice for the public would be, to pay the compensation with one hand, 
whilst they apply the axe with the other; and this rule is departed from only because 
some time is necessary, by the forms of law, to conduct the inquiry; and this delay 
must be compensated by interest. But in other respects the damages must be 
appraised upon the same rule, as they would have been on the day of the taking. 
Parks v. City of Boston, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 198, 208–09 (1834). 
Admittedly, a significant problem arises when setting the valuation date at the date of 
taking, for there is debate about when a taking actually occurs. Some states set the date of 
taking at the time of trial even though the condemnor might not have taken possession or 
received title at that time. See 5 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 18.16 
(3d ed. 2001). Presumably, this convention arose in states that set the date of valuation at the 
date of taking while permitting or requiring a compensation determination before title passed 
to the condemnor. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.660(2) (Michie 1992); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 25-46.3 (Michie 2000). See Part III.B for a more detailed discussion of the taking date 
problem. 
 56. The term “trier of fact” is necessarily broad. Nearly every state permits the parties in 
a condemnation proceeding to try the issue of compensation before a court or jury. However, 
twenty-six states require an initial determination by a board of commissioners. See 7 PATRICK J. 
ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2A.03 tbl. II (2002). These 
states are Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
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be the date of taking. Some courts have reacted to this procedural 
difficulty by determining a valuation date earlier in time than the 
taking date.57 State legislatures have also responded by adopting 
statutes that set the date of valuation, many of them mimicking the 
court-created standards.58 
The valuation date statutes of the several states are varied in both 
clarity and in the standards they adopt.59 A few states have code 
sections specifically devoted to setting the date of valuation,60 while 
others bury valuation date standards in codes that govern eminent 
domain procedure generally.61 Twenty-one states and the District of 
Columbia have no valuation date statute, even though all states and 
the district have fairly extensive eminent domain codes.62 This 
deficiency may be no accident. For example, Alabama, which has 
adopted the Uniform Eminent Domain Code (“UEDC”) nearly in 
its entirety,63 has expressly refused to adopt the UEDC’s date of 
valuation section.64 A date of valuation law is necessary, however, in 
 
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Interestingly, in Kentucky, the commission is to be composed of 
“three (3) impartial housekeepers of the county who are owners of land.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 416.580(1) (Michie 1992). Other states require some level of expertise from their 
commissioners. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 6B.4 (West 2001) (providing for twenty-eight 
commissioners in total, seven who own or operate agricultural property, seven who own city 
property, seven who are licensed real estate salespersons or brokers, and seven who have special 
property value knowledge because of their occupation). 
 57. See 3 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 8.05[2] nn.19–30 (listing cases from states that 
have early valuation dates because of condemnation procedures that generally require 
compensation assessment before taking). 
 58. For a list by jurisdiction of the cases that provide these standards, see 5 SACKMAN, 
supra note 14, § 18.16 nn.1–21 (2001). 
 59. See infra app. (summarizing each state’s statutory treatment of valuation dates). 
 60. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130 (West 1982); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 101–124 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-103 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-
30 (West 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-440 (Law. Co-op. 1991); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-
703 (Michie 1997); see also infra app. 
 61. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 8.04.092, 8.12.190 (1992); WIS. STAT. §§ 32.09(1), 
32.05(7)(c), 32.06(7) (1998); see also infra app. 
 62. See infra app. The states with no valuation date statute are Alabama, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Vermont, and West Virginia. See infra app. 
 63. See THEODORE J. NOVAK ET AL., CONDEMNATION OF PROPERTY: PRACTICE AND 
STRATEGIES FOR WINNING JUST COMPENSATION § 16.3, at 131 (1994). 
 64. See ALA. CODE § 18-1A-170 commentary (1997) (“The ‘compensation standard’ 
under the UEDC [(Uniform Eminent Domain Code)] is stated in UEDC Section 1002. That 
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order to determine property value,65 so states like Alabama that have 
no valuation date statute must rely—intentionally or unintention-
ally—on their common-law standards. 
A few states have well-developed valuation date statutes. 
California, for example, provides three methods of valuation in its 
eminent domain code.66 First, unless there is an earlier appropriate 
date, the valuation date is the date that the condemnor deposits 
probable compensation with the court.67 Second, if there is to be a 
trial on the issue of compensation, and the trial occurs within one 
year of the condemnation proceeding’s commencement, then the 
valuation date is the proceeding’s commencement date.68 Third, 
unless the landowner has caused the delay, if the trial on 
compensation begins after one year from the proceeding’s 
commencement, then the valuation date is the date of the trial’s 
commencement.69 So, in California, the valuation date may be (1) 
the date of compensation deposit, (2) the date of proceeding 
commencement, or (3) the date of trial commencement. New Jersey 
also has a well-developed valuation date statute that provides 
multiple valuation options: (1) the date that the condemnor 
possesses the property, (2) the date that the condemnation 
proceeding commences, or (3) the date that the condemnor’s action 
“substantially affects the [condemnee’s] use and enjoyment of the 
property.”70 Notably, New Jersey’s third “use and enjoyment” 
provision affords a court considerable interpretative leeway to set the 
valuation date at very early stages of a condemnation action.71 
 
‘standard’ is the ‘fair market value determined . . . as of the date of valuation.’ UEDC Section 
1002 has been omitted from this Code . . . . UEDC Section 1003 (Date of Valuation) also has 
been omitted from this Code.”). 
 65. See 5 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 18.16 (citing United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 
253 (1980); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 
246 (1934)). 
 66. California’s eminent domain code sections are located at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§§ 1230.010–1273.050 (West 1982). The sections that specifically deal with valuation date 
determination are CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130. 
 67. Id. § 1263.110. 
 68. Id. § 1263.120. 
 69. Id. § 1263.130. 
 70. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-30 (West 1997). The statute mentions a fourth possible 
date that applies only to abandoned property. 
 71. See, e.g., Township of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg, 695 A.2d 1344, 1358 (N.J. 1997) 
(holding in a 4-3 decision that the date of a letter sent to the landowner, informing her that 
her land might be condemned, was the effective date of valuation under N.J. STAT. ANN. 
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Overall, twenty-nine states have a valuation date statute of some 
kind. These various statutes describe a wide range of valuation dates, 
such as the date of summons, the date of trial on compensation, the 
date that the condemnation action begins,72 the date that the 
condemnor deposits probable compensation, and the date that the 
condemnor takes the land. The most common date of valuation is 
the date of summons or service of summons. Alaska, Arizona, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah use this date. Similarly, 
Indiana values property on the service date of the “condemnation 
notice.”73 Nevada’s valuation statute qualifies its summons date 
provision by setting the valuation date at the date of trial when trial 
begins more than two years after the first service of summons and 
when either the condemnor or court backlog caused the delay.74 In 
fact, setting the valuation date at the date that trial on compensation 
commences is another common statutory option in the states. 
California, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Nevada, Texas, and Washington have provisions that might require 
valuing at the trial date or at the date of a similar proceeding.75 
Alternatively, California, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, Virginia, and Wyoming may use the date that a 
condemnor files or commences the condemnation action.76 Many 
 
§ 20:3-30(c) (West 1997)). 
 72. A valuation date could even be before the condemnor commences action. See supra 
note 71. 
 73. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.330 (Michie 2000) (issuance of summons); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 12-1123(A) (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 101-24 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 7-712 
(Michie 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-1-9(g) (Michie 2002) (service of condemnation 
notice); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-302 (2001) (service of summons); NEV. REV. STAT. 
37.120(1) (2001) (service of summons); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-11 (1996); see also infra 
app. 
 74. See NEV. REV. STAT. 37.120(1) (2001); see also infra app. 
 75. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 38-1-114(1) (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.071(2), 74.051 (West 1987); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 416.660(2) (Michie 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:9(A), :14, :153 (West 1979) 
(applying the valuation date to partial takings where the condemnor is port authority, state 
university, or state department of public works); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-103 
(1996); NEV. REV. STAT. 37.120(1) (2001); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.042(b) (Vernon 
2000) (time of special commissioners’ hearing); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 8.04.092, 8.12.190 
(1992) (for condemnation actions by cities but not by the state); see also infra app. Some of 
these states may only list trial commencement as one of several valuation date possibilities, the 
application of which will depend upon the circumstances of particular cases. See infra note 79. 
 76. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130 (West 1982); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. § 5/7-121 (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.70, sec. 20(3) (West 1998); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-27-19 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-30 (West 1997) (date 
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states have condemnation procedures that permit or require the 
condemnor to deposit probable compensation with a court, and 
some of these states may value the property on the date of deposit, 
including California, Florida, and Louisiana.77 Five states use the 
date of taking as the valuation date: Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
North Dakota, and Virginia.78 Seven states—California, Colorado, 
Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia—have 
statutory schemes that provide multiple alternative valuation dates 
depending on the circumstances of particular cases.79 
There are a variety of less common statutory provisions. For 
example, North Carolina sets the date of valuation at a time 
“immediately prior” to the condemnation action commencement,80 
and Pennsylvania probably requires a time “immediately before” the 
actual taking.81 In similar fashion, Massachusetts establishes the 
valuation date at a time before the recording of a taking order,82 and 
Louisiana may, depending on the circumstances, value property at a 
 
condemnation proceedings commenced is one of four options); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42A-1-
24(A) (Michie 1994); see also id. § 42-2-15(A); VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.3 (Michie 2000) 
(one of two options); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-703 (Michie 2001) (date condemnation action 
commenced); see also infra app. 
 77. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 73.071(2), 74.051 (West 1987) (if landowner does not request a hearing); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 19:9(A), :14, :153 (West 1979); see also infra app. 
 78. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.660(2) (Michie 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 19:9(A), :14, :153 (West 1979); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-103 (1996); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 32-15-23 (1996) (date of taking is the only statutory option); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 25-46.3 (2000); see also infra app. Even though each of these five states use the date of 
taking as the effective valuation date, they may define the date of taking differently, resulting in 
different valuation dates depending on the state. For a more detailed discussion of the 
problems associated with the date of taking, see infra Part III.A. 
 79. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 38-1-114(1) (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.071(2), 74.051 (West 1987); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 416.660(2) (Michie 1992); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-103 (1996); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 20:3-30 (West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.3 (Michie 2000); see also infra 
app. 
 80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-63 (2002); see also infra app. 
 81. See 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1-602(a) (1997); see also infra app. Pennsylvania’s code 
does not clearly provide for valuation of a total taking. Section 1-602 directly applies to partial 
takings and states that the landowner receives the value of the difference between the 
property’s value before and after the taking. See id. § 1-602(a) (1997). A landowner in a total 
taking has no property left to value after the taking, so the concern is with the property’s value 
at (or “immediately before”) the time of taking. Hence, the statement in the text here is an 
extrapolation from the statutory language. 
 82. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 12 (West 1993); see also infra app. 
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time before the condemnor proposed the taking.83 In Colorado, if a 
condemnor possesses the condemned property prior to a trial on 
compensation, then the date of possession is the effective valuation 
date.84 New Jersey has a similar time of possession provision.85 
Somewhat surprisingly, only one state—Florida—describes the 
possibility of valuation at the date that title actually passes to the 
condemnor.86 Finally, Wisconsin’s statutory framework provides that 
if the condemnation is for sewers or transportation, the valuation 
date is the date of the compensation’s recording at the county 
register’s office.87 Otherwise, Wisconsin sets that valuation date at 
the date of filing of a lis pendens.88 
2. The policy of valuation date statutes 
Sound policy considerations have likely motivated state 
legislatures to adopt date of valuation statutes. These policy 
considerations at least include preventing the hazards of property 
value fluctuations, increasing administrative efficiency, and providing 
consistency and predictability. Ultimately, these considerations are 
secondary to the policies that support the constitutional just 
compensation mandate.89 Any statutory valuation scheme must not 
deny the landowner just compensation for his or her taken property. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, valuation date statutes 
attempt to deal with property value fluctuations.90 Property values do 
not remain constant over time,91 and indeed, they can change 
 
 
 83. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:9(A), :14, :153 (West 1979); see also infra app. 
 84. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-114(1) (2000); see also infra app. 
 85. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-30(a)–(d) (West 1997) (one of four options, the earliest 
of which is the proper valuation date); see also infra app. 
 86. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.071(2), 74.051 (West 1987); see also infra app. 
 87. See WIS. STAT. §§ 32.09(1), 32.05(7)(c), 32.06(7) (1998). 
 88. See id.; see also infra app. 
 89. See supra text accompanying notes 47–50. 
 90. See, e.g., Saratoga Fire Prot. Dist. v. Hackett, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 701 (Ct. App. 
2002) (“[T]he primary purpose of the Legislature in enacting section [1263.120, formerly 
section 1249,] was to protect the parties against fluctuations in the market value of real 
property.”). 
 91. See 3 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 8.05 (“The value of real estate is by no means 
constant, and before compensation can be intelligently assessed for the taking of land by 
eminent domain, a point of time must be fixed as of which the property is to be valued.”); see 
also 5 id. § 18.16. 
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drastically in a few weeks or months.92 Consequently, since triers of 
fact in condemnation proceedings must determine value and award 
just compensation, necessity demands a time of valuation. With a 
definite valuation date, the trier of fact or the parties can retain 
appraisers and begin the sometimes laborious and often time-
consuming process of property valuation.93 There is, however, a 
deeper justification than necessity: Date of valuation statutes protect 
both parties in a condemnation proceeding from value fluctuations. 
Condemnors will not have to pay more compensation if the value 
increases before the trier determines the compensation amount,94 
and the condemnees will not have to receive less compensation if 
their land values decrease.95 Conversely, condemnors cannot take 
advantage of value depreciations, and condemnees may not benefit 
from value increases.96 In the case of depreciation, the condemnors’ 
own actions often cause the decrease in land value.97 Ultimately, the 
 
 92. See, e.g., Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701 (property value increased sixty 
percent, from $2 million to $3.2 million, in a ten month period). 
 93. For a detailed summary of the appraisal process, see EATON, supra note 6. 
 94. See, e.g., Utah State Rd. Comm’n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 830 n.8 (Utah 1984) 
(“A publicly announced general plan of area-wide condemnation may have the effect of 
artificially increasing the value of properties not initially included in the area to be condemned 
before judicial proceedings have been commenced, thereby resulting in a windfall to the 
landowner . . . . Although the constitutional guarantee of just compensation protects private 
property owners and not the State, our interpretation of [Utah’s valuation date statute] . . . 
allows an appropriate adjustment in the date of valuation to be made to protect the State 
against having to pay an award of compensation unfair to it.”); Casino Reinvestment Dev. 
Auth. v. Hauck, 722 A.2d 949, 952 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (“‘The statute is also 
designed to insulate the condemnor from the ravages of an inflationary spiral’ resulting from 
the anticipation of a governmental taking.”). 
 95. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 177 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
1961) (“As houses begin to come down, tenants in nearby homes move out, the 
neighborhood deteriorates or is deserted, vandalism often sets in, appearances and values 
depreciate with the result that frequently the property owner is greatly handicapped in 
presenting his case to the jury by the time his land gets into court.”); Hauck, 722 A.2d at 952 
(“The object of [New Jersey’s valuation date law] is thus ‘to protect the condemnee from a 
decrease in the value of its property which is attributable to the cloud of condemnation’ caused 
by the acts of the condemnor.”). 
 96. Value increases that could benefit the condemnee may be at issue if the actual taking 
occurs after value determination. See, e.g., Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696; see also infra 
Part III.B.2. Consequently, the landowner might receive this benefit to satisfy the demands of 
the just compensation principle. 
 97. See Kacmarik, 177 N.E.2d at 813; State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 828 (Alaska 
1976) (reasoning that the policy underlying a valuation date set at the date of summons 
issuance was to prevent the state from taking advantage of the drop in property values that 
occurs when the state condemns property). Interestingly, at least one state has attempted to 
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interest in protecting the landowner from land value depreciation 
outweighs the apparent loss to the condemnor.  
Valuation date statutes also afford the governing body some 
degree of administrative efficiency.98 When the date is set, courts or 
hearing commissions can avoid argument on what the proper date is 
and focus instead on determining value. Furthermore, parties can 
move forward with collection of evidence to demonstrate value as of 
the set date, and the proceeding can move forward and terminate 
without a burdensome, continual updating of the valuation evidence. 
Importantly, legislatures probably imagined that the condemnation 
actions would proceed quickly.99 Valuation date laws theoretically 
streamline the process and encourage it to end before land values can 
change much.100 
Valuation date statutes also attempt to provide consistency and 
predictability. With a clearly established valuation date, the triers of 
fact and the parties to condemnation actions can determine the 
appropriate valuation date and develop reasonable expectations 
about the required evidence and the ultimate result. Also, 
condemnors will know in advance of a condemnation action how the 
property will be valued, and knowing this information may affect the 
decision to take the property. Notably, consistency and predictability 
are not always the rule since just compensation is the overriding 
principle in value determinations. A trier of fact might apply a 
valuation date that is different than the statutorily created date in 
order to meet the constitutional mandate, though a properly drafted 
statute could avoid a trier’s need to disregard statutory language.101 
 
deal with condemnor-caused valuation changes by statute. See 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1-604 
(1997) (“Any change in the fair market value prior to the date of condemnation which the 
condemnor or condemnee establishes was substantially due to the general knowledge of the 
imminence of condemnation . . . shall be disregarded in determining fair market value.”). 
 98. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.15 (1984). 
 99. See, e.g., Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700 (“The purpose of our eminent 
domain statutes is obvious. The Legislature undoubtedly envisioned speedy acquisitions and 
timely compensation.”). 
 100. See id. 
 101. That courts occasionally disregard valuation date statutes to provide just 
compensation goes to the heart of the problem this Comment discusses. See infra Part III.B; 
see also Mayor of Balt. v. Kelso Corp., 380 A.2d 216 (Md. 1977) (holding that the valuation 
date cannot be applied to deprive a property owner of the just compensation he or she is 
entitled to receive under the Maryland Constitution). But see Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. 
v. Hauck, 722 A.2d 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (rigidly applying the date of 
valuation law). 
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III. THE DATE OF VALUATION DILEMMA 
The date of valuation dilemma is simply explained. Condemnees 
are entitled to the value of their taken property when they are forced 
to surrender all rights to use, enjoy, and possess it.102 Valuation date 
statutes often set the valuation date at a time earlier than the time 
condemnees surrender103 these rights. If the property value increases 
materially between the date of valuation and the time that 
condemnees actually relinquish their rights, then application of the 
date of valuation statute denies just compensation.104 A court with 
jurisdiction over the condemnation matter must decide between 
enforcing the valuation date law or upholding the principle of just 
compensation. 
Although articulating the date of valuation dilemma is simple, 
resolving it is not. The explication and resolution of the dilemma lies 
on two levels. First, the condemnee is entitled to compensation at 
the time that he or she last had rights to his or her property, which is 
at the time of taking (or immediately before the taking), but it is not 
clear what qualifies as a taking. Consequently, it is difficult to 
determine the time a taking occurred and the concurrent surrender 
of property rights by the condemnee. Second, assuming the time of 
taking is established, a court overseeing a condemnation matter must 
 
 102. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also 3 SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 8.05 
(The value of property taken by eminent domain “is determined as of the time that the owner 
is entitled to receive.”). Effectively, the landowner’s surrender of rights occurs at the time of 
taking. See infra Part III.A. 
There are those who have argued that the taking occurs prior to the landowner’s 
surrender of legal property rights. In Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. at 
13, the Supreme Court framed the argument: “The filing of a complaint in condemnation and 
a notice of lis pendens . . . has the effect of preventing the owner of unimproved land thereafter 
from making any profitable use of it, or of selling it to another private party.” The Court 
rejected the argument under the case’s particular facts and reasoned that “[u]ntil title passed to 
the United States, [the landowner] was free to make whatever use it pleased of its property.” 
Id. at 15. 
 103. Use of the term “surrender” here does not also imply the power of the condemnee 
to refuse to give up the rights. When the government takes land for a legitimate public use, the 
condemnee cannot refuse. He or she is, however, entitled to just compensation for the taking. 
In County of Dona Ana v. Bennett, 867 P.2d 1160, 1164 (N.M. 1994), the court states that 
property should be valued at the time that the condemnee “loses control” over the property, 
which is perhaps more precise terminology. 
 104. Importantly, the date of valuation dilemma is not about paying interest on a 
compensation award. Post-judgment interest compensates a condemnee for the lost value of 
money. The date of valuation dilemma instead focuses on a land value change between the 
valuation date and the actual taking. 
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still determine how that taking date is useful for providing the 
landowner just compensation. For example, suppose in a particular 
jurisdiction that there is an accepted court rule or legislative mandate 
that a taking occurs when the condemnor possesses the property, 
dispossessing the condemnee. Assume that in a condemnation action 
the possession actually occurs several months after a trial on 
compensation, and the taken land’s value increases significantly 
between trial and actual possession.105 The date of valuation is a 
separate determination from the date of taking, so if the legislature 
has also ruled that the summons date or the trial date is the date of 
valuation, then the condemnee will not receive just compensation if 
the statute is applied. 
This very problem has arisen in a surprising number of cases.106 
Furthermore, it has the potential to arise again because the valuation 
date laws in the several states establish valuation dates at various 
times, apparently without considering the condemnee’s surrender of 
property rights as a factor in determining the valuation date.107 
Courts in states that have laws permitting a valuation date at a time 
different than the time that the condemnee actually surrenders 
property rights can encounter the date of valuation dilemma. In the 
following discussion, section A deals with the first level of the 
valuation date problem by examining the related date of taking 
problem. Section B discusses leading judicial responses to the 
valuation date dilemma. 
A. The Related Date of Taking Problem 
The date of valuation always stands in relation to the date of 
taking. There can be important effects on valuation date analysis 
depending on whether the taking occurs before or after the 
condemnor provides compensation.108 Some states require that 
 
 105. This hypothetical situation is similar to the factual situation described in Saratoga 
Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697–98, except that in Saratoga Fire the condemnor had not yet 
taken possession while the property value had increased significantly from the date of valuation. 
See infra Part III.B.2. 
 106. See infra Part III.B. 
 107. In these states, the legislatures appear to have focused more on relieving 
administrative burdens and dealing with other policy considerations than on the substantive 
question of when a taking actually occurs. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 108. See 11A MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 32.97. 
BAU-FIN 2/15/2003 3:43 PM 
265] When Date of Valuation Statutes Deny 
 285 
compensation occur before the taking,109 and this requirement raises 
obvious concerns about when to value the property: a property 
cannot be valued at taking if it cannot be taken until valued. In order 
to meet the just compensation requirement, states in this category 
may have to adjust their standards and either value property at the 
time of taking or permit adjustment of the compensation amount 
after a trial on compensation. 
At first glance, the question of when a taking occurs may be 
simply answered by reference to the time that the government 
actually takes the land; however, it is not clear when this action 
occurs. It may be that the government takes when it physically 
possesses the property. Or, the taking may occur when the 
government begins the condemnation proceeding. Alternatively, the 
government may effectively take the land when it merely decides or 
proposes to exercise its eminent domain right. There is no consensus 
among the states.110 
Before dealing with the factors that mark the taking date, it is 
important to understand the procedures that governments generally 
use to take property by eminent domain. While each state has 
somewhat different procedures, the federal approach provides a good 
overview of the basic law.111 Under the United States Code, the 
government has at least three methods for exercising its eminent 
domain right: (1) straight condemnation, (2) “quick take,” and (3) 
legislative taking.112 A fourth, less common method is the taking by 
oust, which is not mentioned in the United States Code.113 
The “straight condemnation” method is described in 40 U.S.C. 
§ 3113.114 This procedure permits an authorized officer of the 
federal government to apply to the Attorney General, who in turn 
 
 109. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-5 (1982); IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 18; KAN. CONST. 
art. 12, § 4. 
 110. See 11A MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 32.97 (“[T]here is an apparent conflict in 
the authorities as to the time from which compensation is to be computed, due in part to 
differing ideas as to what constitutes a ‘taking . . . .’”). 
 111. For a more detailed discussion of each state’s basic eminent domain procedure (with 
the exception of Maine, whose eminent domain procedure is scattered throughout its code), 
see 7 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 56, § 2A.03[1]–[51]. 
 112. See 40 U.S.C. §§ 3113–3114 (2002); FED. R. CIV. P. 71A. 
 113. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 5 (1984). 
 114. See also Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 4 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 257, which was replaced by 
§ 3113 in 2002). 
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may initiate the condemnation proceedings.115 Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 71A governs this proceeding.116 The district court may 
appoint a commission to determine the property’s value, and 
following that determination, the government may either 
compensate the landowner that amount and take the land or seek 
dismissal of the condemnation action.117 
The United States Code also provides for a “quick-take” 
procedure similar to procedures developed in various states.118 
Section 3114 of 40 U.S.C. permits the condemning governmental 
entity to file a “declaration of taking” before judgment in the 
condemnation action.119 This declaration states that the government 
takes the property pursuant to the declaration. Hence, the taking 
occurs at the time of the declaration.120 The government must 
deposit estimated compensation into the court at that time, and title 
and right to the land vest concurrent with the deposit.121 Subsequent 
judicial proceedings may still determine the appropriate amount of 
compensation, but the government is henceforth in possession of the 
property.122 
Two other methods of taking are the legislative taking and the 
oust. First, the federal government may exercise its eminent domain 
right by legislative enactment.123 The legislation that effects the 
taking will also provide a special procedure for determining 
compensation after the taking occurs.124 Second, with oust, the 
government expropriates privately owned property, not by any 
statutorily authorized procedure, but by physically entering the 
property and ousting the owner.125 The owner has a right to bring a  
 
 
 115. 40 U.S.C. § 3113. 
 116. FED. R. CIV. P. 71A. 
 117. 40 U.S.C. § 3114. 
 118. See id. For examples of state “quick take” procedures, see ALASKA STAT. 
§ 09.55.440 (Michie 2000); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.410 (West 1982); 735 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/7-103 (West 1992). 
 119. 40 U.S.C. § 3114. 
 120. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1984). 
 121. 40 U.S.C. § 3114; see also Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 4–5. 
 122. See Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 5. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. (citing United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 747–49 (1947)). 
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suit, known as an inverse condemnation suit,126 to recover the value 
of the land on the date of the oust, which is the date of taking.127 
Quick takes, legislative takings, and ousts present the least 
analytical concern in determining when the taking occurs. It occurs 
when there is a judicial order accompanied by a deposit of 
compensation, a legislative enactment, or a physical entry and 
assertion of ownership. Straight condemnation is more enigmatic 
because three distinct events could be considered the taking. First, 
the taking may be said to occur at the time of physical possession 
where, similar to an oust, the government officially takes the land 
when it moves its agents onto the property and begins the intended 
project. Second, the taking may occur at the time that the 
government compensates the condemnee. Finally, the taking could 
occur when the title vests in the condemnor, which may be either 
when the government pays compensation (either to the condemnee 
or as a deposit into the court) or when a judicial or administrative 
order vests title. Any one of these options alone probably constitutes 
the time that the government takes the property since at any one of 
these events the condemnee surrenders legal right to the land. 
Courts and legislatures have not always clearly responded to the 
takings date problem. The United States Supreme Court offered a 
rule in Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States,128 but in doing 
so, the Court appeared to equivocate. The majority first held that 
“[u]nless a taking has occurred previously in actuality or by a 
statutory provision . . . , we are of the view that the taking in a 
condemnation suit . . . takes place upon the payment of the money 
award by the condemnor.”129 Later, the Court reasoned that at the 
time of trial, which is when compensation must be determined, “no 
one knows when the United States will exercise its option to 
purchase the property, so adoption of the date of payment as the 
date of valuation is infeasible.”130 The Court’s holding is not entirely 
 
 126. Inverse condemnation suits are so called because the owner, who is normally the 
defendant in a condemnation action, is the plaintiff in these kinds of suits. 
 127. Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 5 (citing United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21–22 
(1958)). 
 128. 467 U.S. 1. 
 129. Id. at 11 (citing Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939)). 
 130. Id. at 16–17. Admittedly, the first statement, cited supra note 129, deals directly 
with the time compensation is paid as the date of taking, whereas the statement quoted in this 
sentence deals directly with the date of valuation. However the two dates, as already 
demonstrated, are closely related: “[I]t should be apparent that identification of the time a 
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unhelpful, for a landowner surrenders legal right to taken property 
when the condemnor pays compensation. The most useful rule, 
however, would have included other date of taking options, such as the 
date of possession or the date title legally vests in the condemnor.131 
Outside the Supreme Court, some states have dealt with the ambiguity 
of the taking date by state court judicial rules that set the taking date at 
the date of proceeding commencement.132 Such rulings settle the 
takings date question (perhaps arbitrarily), but they still give rise to the 
date of valuation dilemma if the takings date is not also the time that 
condemnees surrender their property rights. In other states, legislatures 
seek to overcome the need for such judicial rulings by statutorily 
assigning the date of taking.133 Ultimately, however, the takings date is 
the date that the condemnee must surrender legal right to the property, 
and any takings date determination must depend on when this 
relinquishment of rights occurs. 
B. Leading Judicial Responses 
Courts have responded to the date of valuation dilemma in 
various ways. In dealing with specific valuation date statutes, state 
 
taking of a tract of land occurs is crucial to determination of the amount of 
compensation . . . .” Id. at 11. 
The Court also approached the question of when a taking occurs in United States v. 
Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958), and ruled that the takings date was the date that the government 
entered the property. See id. at 24 (“[I]f the value of the property changed between the time 
the Government took possession and the time of filing, payment as of the latter date would not 
be an accurate reflection of the value of what the property owner gave up and the Government 
acquired.”). In Dow, however, the government had entered the property three years before 
filing the condemnation action for purposes of determining just compensation. Id. at 18. If, in 
the alternative, the government entry did not occur for a period of time after the 
compensation proceeding, then the Court would likely determine an earlier takings date. The 
earlier date would be a time at which the condemnee surrendered all rights to the property, 
such as at the time that the government paid compensation or otherwise acquired legal title. In 
any event, the latest a taking could occur would be when the government enters the land. See 
id. at 23–24. 
 131. As noted in the previous paragraph, a condemnee surrenders his or her property 
rights (1) at the time of condemnor possession, (2) at the time of compensation, or (3) at the 
time title vests in the condemnor. 
 132. See, e.g., Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 859 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ariz. 1993) 
(proceeding commencement); W. Va. Dep’t of Highways v. Roda, 352 S.E.2d 134, 138–39 
(W. Va. 1986) (date of taking is the date of proceeding commencement). 
 133. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.660(2) (Michie 1992) (“The taking date for 
valuation purposes shall be either the date the condemnor takes the land, or the date of the 
trial of the issue of just compensation, whichever comes first.”). 
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courts have been faced with four options: (1) rule that the statute 
was unconstitutional or that a particular application of it was 
unconstitutional, (2) alter the date of valuation and rule that altering 
it falls within the meaning of the statute, (3) rigorously apply the 
statute, or (4) ignore the valuation date law and use a different 
standard. The following discussion briefly reviews the Supreme 
Court’s Kirby Forest decision134—which did not deal with a specific 
valuation date law but did offer valuable insight into how the Court 
might rule if faced with the valuation date dilemma—and four other 
cases that demonstrate how several jurisdictions have, in sometimes 
surprising ways, resolved the valuation date dilemma. 
1. The Supreme Court’s decision 
The Kirby Forest case arguably settled the date of valuation 
problem eighteen years ago. The primary question that the Court 
dealt with was not what the date of valuation should have been, but 
what the date of taking was and whether interest could be computed 
from that date.135 The date of the taking, the Court concluded, was 
the date that the government paid the landowner for the property.136 
This response has an obvious impact on property valuation, but the 
Court’s most important insights on the valuation date dilemma 
emerge in its analysis of the interest question. The Court reasoned 
that, notwithstanding any interest award, if designating a date other 
than the date of payment as the valuation date “provide[s] the owner 
substantially less than the fair market value of his property on the 
date the United States tenders payment, it violates the Fifth 
Amendment.”137 The facts of Kirby Forest demonstrate that this 
violating situation could easily arise. 
In the Kirby Forest case, Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. (“Kirby 
Forest”), a forest products manufacturer, owned about 2,000 acres 
of forest land that the federal government wanted in order to create 
Big Thicket National Preserve.138 In 1974,139 Congress enacted 
 
 134. 467 U.S. 1. 
 135. See id. at 9. 
 136. See id. at 11. But see supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 137. Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 17. 
 138. See id. at 6–7. 
 139. Interestingly, the National Park Service conducted a study in 1967 that resulted in a 
recommendation to create a 35,500 acre Big Thicket National Park in eastern Texas. See id. at 
6. Kirby Forest’s 2,000 plus acres were part of the recommended national park. Id. In response 
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legislation authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to acquire the 
land pursuant to the straight condemnation procedures now 
described in 40 U.S.C. § 3113.140 After negotiations to purchase the 
land failed, the government instituted a condemnation action on 
August 21, 1978, and the compensation trial began before a hearing 
commission on March 6, 1979.141 The commission set compensation 
at $2,331,202.142 Both parties objected, but on August 13, 1981, a 
district judge entered judgment awarding the commission’s 
compensation amount plus interest running from August 21, 1978, 
which was the filing date of the condemnation action.143 The United 
States finally made its payment of compensation on March 26, 1982, 
three years after the date upon which the hearing commission valued 
the property.144 
Kirby Forest requested that the Court award interest for the time 
period between the valuation date and the taking date, but the Court 
declined, noting that changes in land market values “bear[] only a 
tenuous relationship to the market rate of interest.”145 Instead of an 
interest payment, the Court proposed a procedure for modifying the 
compensation award “when there is a substantial delay between the 
date of valuation and the date the judgment is paid, during which 
time the value of the land changes materially.”146 Specifically dealing 
with the litigants in Kirby Forest, the Court remanded the case for 
consideration of the land’s value on the date that the government 
paid compensation.147 Speaking generally, however, the Court 
suggested that Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
offered a solution to condemnees who were denied just 
 
to the National Park Service’s recommendation, the Texas Forestry Association issued a 1967 
moratorium on all logging in the designated area. Id. So, when condemnation proceedings 
finally commenced in 1979, Kirby Forest had already foregone logging on its own land for 
twelve years. See id. at 6–7. 
 140. See id. at 7. At the time of the Kirby Forest case, the code section related to straight 
condemnation procedures was located at 40 U.S.C. § 257. 
 141. See Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 7. 
 142. Id. at 8. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. at 17. 
 146. Id. at 17–18 (emphasis added). 
 147. See id. at 19. On the condition that the district court would consider such land value 
evidence, the judgment of the court of appeals that the government owed Kirby Forest no 
interest was affirmed. Id. 
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compensation when the government failed to pay compensation (and 
consequently did not take) until after a substantial period elapsed 
from the date of valuation.148 Rule 60(b) permits a court to amend a 
final order for “any . . . reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment.”149 Providing the constitutionally required just 
compensation is unquestionably a reason that justifies relief from 
judgment. 
2. Leading state cases 
In Saratoga Fire Protection District v. Hackett,150 a California 
appellate court faced a constitutional challenge to California’s 
valuation date statute. The Saratoga Fire Protection District (“the 
District”) condemned the defendant’s office building to use as a 
residence for firefighters, offices, and parking.151 The District, 
pursuant to California’s eminent domain procedure, filed a 
condemnation action on December 17, 1999.152 California’s 
valuation date statute set this filing date as date of valuation for the 
trial on compensation, and the parties stipulated that the property 
was worth $2 million on that date.153 Before trial began on 
November 13, 2000, the defendant obtained two more appraisals. 
One, on October 5, 2000, valued the property at $3,049,412, and 
the next, on October 12, 2000, revealed a fair market value of $3.2 
million.154 The condemnee sought to introduce evidence of these 
later appraisals during trial, and the District objected by motion. The 
trial court reluctantly granted the motion, feeling bound by a history 
of rigid application of the state’s valuation date law.155 
 
 148. See id. at 18. 
 149. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
 150. 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 151. Id. at 698. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.120 (West 1982). 
 154. Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698. 
 155. See id. at 698–99. As reported in the appellate court’s opinion, the trial judge stated: 
I feel constrained to grant that motion [to exclude the October 2000 appraisal 
evidence]. The statute is so clear; the history is so long. Some of the cases call this 
settled law. I feel that I have to do that. Now, having said that, there seems to be 
some unfairness here, to be candid, in this market with the way things are working. 
And it certainly wouldn’t be unreasonable for the Legislature to revisit this in terms 
of shortening the time period or changing the date of valuation under these 
circumstances. Particularly strikes me as unfair that if there’s a loss, that the 
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The Saratoga Fire court briefly mentioned each of California’s 
three date of valuation methods, noting that the lower court 
properly applied section 1263.120 since the trial began within one 
year of the condemnation action’s filing date.156 However, the court 
held that section 1263.120, as applied to the defendant in this case, 
was both unjust and unconstitutional, and so it reversed the trial 
court’s decision.157 The court reasoned that the policy underlying 
just compensation, as required by both the federal and state 
constitutions, was to make sure the landowner was not forced to 
“contribute more than his proper share to the public 
undertaking . . . [and] to distribute throughout the community the 
loss inflicted upon the individual by the making of public 
improvements.”158 Citing both the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kirby Forest and a California Supreme Court decision, the 
Saratoga Fire court reiterated that “any substantial increase in the 
fair market value between the dates of valuation and taking must be 
paid in order to provide ‘just compensation.’”159 Section 1263.120 
was, like “all condemnation law, . . . but a means to the 
constitutional end of just compensation,”160 and where the statute 
failed to meet the constitutional mandate, the courts had to ensure 
that the landowner received just compensation.161 
Another leading valuation date case is County of Dona Ana v. 
Bennett,162 in which the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld its 
 
landowner bears the loss; but if there’s an appreciation in value, the landowner 
doesn’t benefit from that . . . . But the law is the law, as I understand it, and I’m 
granting your motion to exclude certain evidence . . . on that basis. 
Id. at 699. Arguably, if there is a loss, the landowner does not bear it because the condemnor 
takes the land that has depreciated in value. However, in California the condemnor can 
abandon the taking for almost any reason for thirty days after filing the complaint, see CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1268.510 (West 1982), and it is not inconceivable that the condemnor 
might do so if the land value significantly depreciated. See also Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 700 (“[U]nless the condemnor has done some additional act which would estop him, he can 
abandon with near impunity.” (citing L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Trump Wilshire Assocs., 50 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 233 (Ct. App. 1996))). 
 156. A more detailed description of California’s date of valuation statutes is located supra 
notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704. 
 158. Id. at 701. 
 159. Id. at 702 (citing Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 17–18 
(1984); Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore, 214 Cal. Rptr. 904, 911 n.9 (1985)). 
 160. Id. at 704 (citation omitted). 
 161. See id. 
 162. 867 P.2d 1160 (N.M. 1994). 
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valuation date statute, but rejected a particular application of it as 
unconstitutional.163 In Bennett, the Dona Ana County Board of 
Commissioners (“the Board”) condemned a portion of the land-
owner’s property in order to make highway improvements.164 Using 
the state’s “quick take” condemnation procedure,165 the Board 
obtained an August 7, 1987, preliminary order to enter the property, 
conditioned on the county’s deposit of just compensation with the 
court.166 Subsequently, the county deposited the compensation 
amount, entered the property in November 1987, and began work 
on the highway improvements, removing nearly three thousand 
cubic yards of soil in the process.167 The trial on compensation began 
October 31, 1988, at which time the trial court entered an order 
that made the August 7, 1987, preliminary order permanent as of 
November 19, 1987.168 The court further disallowed any evidence 
regarding the value of the removed soil and then instructed the jury 
that November 19, 1987, was the takings date and the date of 
valuation.169 
New Mexico’s date of valuation statute sets the valuation date at 
the date that the condemnor files a condemnation petition.170 The 
court reasoned that this date of valuation was impermissible because 
at the time that a condemnation petition is filed, there has not yet 
been a taking.171 If the property’s value does not change between the 
filing and the time that legal title vests in the condemnor, then there 
is no harm in using the filing date as the valuation date.172 
Alternatively, if the land’s value increases between those two dates, 
then applying the statutory valuation date denies the landowner just 
compensation.173 The statute, the court held, was in conflict with the 
state constitution.174 Ultimately, the court held that the date that the 
preliminary order became effective was the valuation date because 
 
 163. See id. at 1162. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-1 to -3 (Michie 1978). 
 166. See Bennett, 867 P.2d at 1162. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. at 1162–63. 
 170. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-15(A) (Michie 1978). 
 171. Bennett, 867 P.2d at 1164. 
 172. See id. at 1165. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1164–65. 
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the preliminary order “vest[ed] the condemnor with possession, 
dominion, and control over the premises.”175 August 7, 1987, was 
the proper date of valuation.176 
The Utah Supreme Court encountered the valuation date 
dilemma in Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg.177 Utah’s date of 
valuation statute provides that the date of summons is the effective 
date of valuation for condemned property.178 In Friberg, the 
condemnees received summons for a condemnation action in June 
1972; the state was taking their land in order to construct a 
freeway.179 However, due in part to a separate legal battle over the 
state’s right to build the freeway, the condemnees remained in 
possession of the property until March 15, 1980.180 In the interim, 
the land’s value appreciated significantly.181 The trial court eventually 
ruled on December 12, 1979, that the state had the right to 
condemn the property, but the court rigorously applied the valuation 
date statute and set the valuation date at June 23, 1972.182 On 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court stated that it was “constrained to 
construe [Utah’s valuation date statute] within the limitations of 
constitutional requirements,” which demand just compensation.183 
“When valuation is fixed at a date prior to the actual taking and the 
value of the property increases during a prolonged condemnation 
proceeding so that the valuation does not . . . constitute ‘just 
compensation,’ the statue . . . is unconstitutional as applied.”184 As 
with the opinions in Saratoga Fire and Bennett, the Friberg court 
likely recognized the administrative necessity of the valuation date 
statutes and only rejected applications that denied just compensation, 
which is the governing principle in value determinations. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently examined the applica-
tion of its date of valuation statute to a rather unique situation. In 
 
 175. Id. at 1164; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-6(A) (Michie 1978). 
 176. Bennett, 867 P.2d at 1165–66. 
 177. 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984). 
 178. Utah’s date of valuation statute is located at UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-11 (1996). 
 179. See Friberg, 687 P.2d at 825. 
 180. See id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 828. 
 183. Id. at 829. 
 184. Id. 
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Township of West Windsor v. Nierenberg,185 the court concluded that 
the effective date of valuation was the date of a letter addressed to 
the landowner indicating that the township might condemn her 
land.186 The relevant New Jersey statute provided considerable room 
for courts to set a valuation date at any time that the condemnor’s 
actions “substantially affect[ed] the use and enjoyment of the 
property by the condemnee.”187 Perhaps most remarkably, after 
applying the rather loose statutory standard to find a date very early 
in the condemnation process, the court concluded its decision with 
an apparent attempt to pacify condemnors: “Condemnors are not 
prejudiced by [the New Jersey valuation date statute] and, in fact, 
may benefit from its application in instances where governmental 
action precipitates a substantial increase in the value of the subject 
property.”188 Of course, this “benefit” entails the precise problem 
that this Comment addresses. Increases in land value before an actual 
taking should accrue to the landowner as part of just compensation. 
IV. DEALING WITH THE DILEMMA 
Without much question, valuation date statutes give rise to 
problems in providing condemnees just compensation. As noted, 
courts are generally capable of responding to problems that arise, 
particularly as they focus on meeting the constitutional just 
compensation requirement. Despite the courts’ general aptitude, 
however, a well-crafted statute can more directly resolve the date of 
valuation dilemma by avoiding the dilemma in the first place. 
Legislators who are drafting valuation date laws can anticipate 
potential conflict and make statutory provisions that pre-empt the 
conflict, thus providing consistent and predictable guidance for 
judges and litigants. 
Based on the analysis developed in Part III, a legislator must first 
establish the time of taking. The time or date of taking will be the 
earliest of (1) the time that the condemnor takes possession of the 
property,189 (2) the time that the condemnor directly compensates 
 
 185. 695 A.2d 1344 (N.J. 1997). 
 186. See id. at 1346–47. 
 187. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-30(c) (West 1997). 
 188. Nierenberg, 695 A.2d at 1358. 
 189. See United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958). 
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the condemnee,190 or (3) the time that the title vests in the 
condemnor through a judicial or administrative order.191 Each of 
these times marks the final dissolution of the condemnee’s legal 
interest or rights in the land. In theory, the divestment of interest 
could occur as soon as the government thinks (metaphorically) “the 
property is mine” because the government’s right of eminent 
domain has no condition of action.192 In practicality, one of the three 
above actions is probably necessary to establish the condemnor’s 
ownership. 
Importantly, the date of taking cannot occur before a time that 
the government action is irrevocable. If the government can revoke 
its decision to take, then it really has not taken the property yet. 
Current statutory schemes, however, do not require irrevocability, as 
detected by the Saratoga Fire court: “[U]nless the condemnor has 
done some additional act which would estop him, he can abandon 
with near impunity.”193 Worse, because of this right to abandon, the 
condemnor may take advantage of all benefits while passing along 
the loss in land value to the original condemnee.194 In effect, the 
initiation of a condemnation proceeding would be illusory as the 
condemnor could commence the proceedings, abandon the action as 
land values become depressed in a recessionary market, and then 
recommence the proceedings to take advantage of lower land 
prices.195 
Under ideal circumstances, just compensation would occur at the 
time of taking and would be a complete and adequate compensation 
for the property, valued in that instant.196 In other words, the date of 
valuation should be the date of taking. Practically, though, value 
determination takes time, and the parties must turn to the market 
and to their appraisers in order to gather evidence that will persuade 
 
 190. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 191. See County of Dona Ana v. Bennett, 867 P.2d 1160, 1164 (N.M. 1994); see also 
supra notes 128–33 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 15–33. 
 193. See Saratoga Fire Prot. Dist. v. Hackett, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 700 (Ct. App. 
2002) (quoting L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. V. Trump Wilshire Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 233 
(Cal. App. 1996)). 
 194. See id. at 699; Township of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg, 695 A.2d 1344, 1358 (N.J. 
1997). 
 195. The situation is somewhat analogous to illusory transfers as developed in the law of 
wills and estates. See, e.g., Pezza v. Pezza, 690 A.2d 345, 348–49 (R.I. 1997). 
 196. See supra note 55. 
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the trier of their valuation. So, even if the eventual valuation date is 
the date of taking, as it should be, preliminary valuation dates may 
be necessary for trial on compensation to go forward. Legislators can 
avoid potentially arbitrary and inconsistent court rulings by 
providing such dates in the date of valuation statute. States with 
constitutions that require compensation before taking197 should be 
particularly attentive to this issue and provide a preliminary valuation 
date, as well as provisions to allow adjustment after the condemnor 
pays compensation.198 
In properly drafting valuation date laws, legislatures must also 
deal with the possible effect of the government’s condemnation 
announcement on property values. Since announcement alone often 
affects the market value of condemned property,199 if the property is 
valued at the time of taking, then that value includes the 
announcement’s effect. The answer in drafting the law is that the 
value must be adjusted for the announcement.200 The governing 
principle is just compensation, and the policy is that the owner must 
be put in the position he or she would have occupied had the taking 
never occurred.201 
Despite the value in establishing the valuation date at the time of 
taking, competing rationales that motivated the previous date of 
valuation determinations still exist. For example, some states have set 
the valuation date at the date summons is issued. The rationale for 
this determination probably runs to the very foundation of eminent 
domain theory: a state’s right to take by eminent domain is inherent 
in the state’s power, and it is only qualified by the public use and just 
compensation limitations.202 The moment a state determines that it 
needs property for public use, the property belongs to the state. 
 
 197. E.g., Georgia, Iowa, and Kansas. See supra note 109. 
 198. There could still be theoretical problems. The compensation could be adjusted after 
the initial trial, but that would mean that the compensation process is not complete, and until 
paid in full, there can be no taking. One can conceive of an endless cycle of valuation and re-
valuation with the taking never coming to fruition. Of course, in practicality, the adjustment 
after initial compensation (to make the compensation “just”) would probably never be viewed 
by a court as an unconstitutional compensation after taking. 
 199. See supra notes 94–97. 
 200. Appraisers are generally capable of making such an evaluation by valuing nearby 
similar, but non-condemned, properties. For a discussion of appraiser considerations during 
valuation, see EATON, supra note 6. 
 201. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 202. See supra Part II.A. 
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Summons is a mere formality to inform the condemnee that the 
property belongs to the government. Furthermore, the date of 
summons marks at least one clear time to consider the property 
taken. If the land does not yet “belong” to the government, it will, 
and the only issue remaining is how much the government will 
compensate the condemnee. The reason that rationales for early 
valuation dates—like the date of summons, or of filing, or of trial—
are uncompelling is that they do not accurately reflect the 
condemnee’s actual retention of concrete rights. The taking occurs, 
and the property should be valued, when the condemnee surrenders 
those rights. 
In addition to clear valuation date statutes, state valuation date 
laws need additional constitutional procedures, similar to those 
articulated in the Kirby Forest case, that permit courts to alter a value 
determination upon motion after the trial on compensation amount. 
Perhaps reference to a Rule 60(b)-type procedure is adequate, 
although a specific provision, tied directly to land value 
determinations in condemnation proceedings, would remove doubt 
as to how to proceed when land values shift dramatically between the 
practical valuation date and the actual taking. 
In addition to crafting new legislation, legislatures seeking to deal 
with the valuation date dilemma have at least three other options: (1) 
require the government to take before compensation, (2) make no 
new legislation, and (3) modify existing laws. First, a legislature could 
avoid the difficulty of setting a valuation date by requiring the 
condemnor to always take before compensation. Most states already 
have statutes that permit this procedure, usually known as a “quick-
take.”203 The procedure avoids the difficulties of date valuation 
because the property is valued at the time that the owner last had an 
interest in it: the date of possession or taking. A difficulty with this 
approach in some states is that their constitutions or statutory schemes 
require compensation prior to taking.204 Aside from the constitutional 
concerns, there are policy considerations. Even though the right of 
eminent domain is inherent in the sovereign’s power, using the quick-
take method with every taking might become politically unpopular,  
 
 
 203. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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especially in our modern society with a burgeoning population that 
calls for more and more taking of land for public works.205 
A legislature may also choose to make no changes to existing 
statutory law. Courts have demonstrated that they will ignore the 
date of valuation statutes when the statutes fail to provide just 
compensation and enforce them when they do.206 The statutes will 
continue to operate in the cases where there is little dispute as to 
compensation, fulfilling their purpose to promote administrative 
efficiency. Significantly, many cases that deal with the date of 
valuation dilemma indicate that application of the relevant valuation 
statute is intensively fact specific,207 so cases in which the valuation 
date dilemma arises may require the fact-specific attention a judge or 
jury can provide. 
Legislatures may choose to retain their existing statutes and 
amend them with provisions on how to deal with the valuation date 
dilemma. California drafted a statute that attempted to prevent the 
inadequate compensation that may occur when property values 
fluctuate significantly between the valuation date (proceeding 
commencement) and the date of taking.208 The statute moves the 
valuation date to a later time if the compensation trial occurs more 
than one year after the condemnation proceedings commence.209 
However, this one-year, bright-line standard has since failed to 
provide just compensation.210 The best approach is probably to 
amend existing laws with the judge-articulated standards from Kirby: 
The states’ old valuation date standards apply unless there is a 
“substantial delay,” during which the land value “materially” 
 
 205. Congress may have had this concern in mind when drafting the 1974 legislation that 
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire east Texas forest lands for the Big Thicket 
National Preserve. See Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 6–7. The Secretary was authorized to use the 
“quick take” procedures under 40 U.S.C. § 258a only if necessary to protect land from 
destruction. See id. at 7. Otherwise, Congress required the Secretary to use straight 
condemnation procedures under 40 U.S.C. § 257, which initially involve negotiations for 
purchase of “condemned” property. Id. 
 206. See supra Part III.B.1–2. 
 207. See generally Saratoga Fire Prot. Dist. v. Hackett, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (Ct. App. 
2002); Utah State Rd. Comm’n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984); see also County of 
Dona Ana v. Bennett, 867 P.2d 1160 (N.M. 1994). In fact, it seems that if the court mentions 
the fact-specific nature of the question early in the decision, it is almost sure to rule against 
applying the valuation date statute in that case. 
 208. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.110–.130 (West 1982). 
 209. See id. 
 210. See Saratoga Fire, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696. 
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changes.211 If these conditions are met, then the material change in 
value warrants altering any judgment based on a previous date of 
valuation. Granted, permitting re-evaluation after the compensation 
determination may promote delay due to the condemnee’s (or the 
condemnor’s) attempt to stretch out an inflationary (or recessionary) 
period, but the statute writers could include provisions about 
defendant-caused delay. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States Constitution and the various state constitu-
tions require just compensation for landowners whose land is taken 
by a condemning authority. Aside from a requirement that takings 
be for public use, this just compensation requirement is the only 
limitation on the government’s exercise of its eminent domain right. 
Hence, any procedure that legislatures institute to govern eminent 
domain must abide by this constitutional just compensation 
principle. 
Valuation date statutes are useful additions to state eminent 
domain procedure codes. They permit the courts and hearing 
commissions that handle condemnation actions to use fixed points in 
time at which to value property. Settling on a time to appraise 
condemned land avoids the uncertainty of ever-shifting land values, 
and it eases the administrative burden of hearing evidence on when 
the valuation date should be. However, these same valuation date 
laws may be the source of constitutional violations. A landowner is 
entitled to just compensation for condemned property at the time 
that the government takes the land. If the valuation date occurs 
weeks or months or years before the government actually takes the 
land, and if the land’s value increases materially between the 
valuation date and the taking date, then the landowner will not 
receive just compensation if the court or hearing commission 
rigorously applies the valuation date law. Legislatures can avoid 
putting courts in the position of choosing between constitutional 
and statutory provisions by drafting appropriate legislation. Clear 
statutory guidance on what constitutes a taking and under what 
circumstances courts must alter a condemnation award in order to 
 
 211. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1984). These 
standards are admittedly less precise than bright-line standards, but they offer flexibility for 
courts to deal with the intensely fact-specific process of valuing property at the proper time. 
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provide just compensation will help produce consistent and 
predictable results for courts and the parties who appear before 
them. 
Christopher A. Bauer 
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APPENDIX 
Date of Valuation Statutes in the Fifty States 
and in the District of Columbia 
STATE CODE SECTION* BASIC PROVISIONS** 
Alabama [ALA. CODE §§ 18-
1A-1 to -311 (1997 
& Supp. 2001).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. 
§ 09.55.330 (Michie 
2000). 
Date of issuance of summons. 
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 12-1123(A) 
(1994). 
Date of summons. 
Arkansas [ARK. CODE ANN. 
§§ 18-15-101 to 
-1505 (Michie 1987 
& Supp. 2001).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
California CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE §§ 1263.110–
.130 (West 1982). 
Three options: 
(1) Date of deposit of probable 
compensation, unless there is an 
earlier appropriate date. 
§ 1263.110. 
(2) Date of condemnation 
proceeding commencement if 
trial begins within one year of 
commencement. § 1263.120. 
 
 
* Bracketed code sections are the eminent domain codes of the states and district that 
do not have date of valuation statutes. 
** Importantly, states listed as having no specific valuation date statute may have a 
judicially-created standard that governs condemned property valuation. 
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 (3) Date of trial commencement 
if trial begins later than one year 
after condemnation proceeding 
commencement, unless there is 
landowner-caused delay.  
§ 1263.130. 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 38-1-114(1) 
(2000). 
The earlier of: 
(1) Date of possession. 
(2) Date of compensation trial or 
hearing. 
Compensation assessment 
remains subject to change for one 
year after initial determination. 
Connecticut [CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 48-1 to -27 (1994 
& Supp. 2002).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Delaware [DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 10, §§ 6101–
6115 (1999).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
District of 
Columbia 
[D.C. CODE ANN. 
§§ 16-1301 to -1385 
(2001).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 73.071(2), 
74.051 (West 1987). 
The earlier of: 
(1) Date of trial. 
(2) Date on which title passes. 
Or 
Date of deposit if landowner does 
not request a hearing. 
Georgia [GA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 22-1-1 to -4-15 
(1982 & Supp. 
2002).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 101-24 (1993). 
Date of summons. 
Idaho IDAHO CODE § 7-
712 (Michie 1998). 
Date of summons. 
Illinois 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. § 5/7-
121 (West 1992). 
Date of filing complaint to 
condemn. 
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Indiana IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 32-24-1-9(g) 
(Michie 2002). 
Date of service of a 
condemnation notice. 
Iowa [IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 6B.1–.59 (West 
2001 & Supp. 
2002).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Kansas [KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 26-101 to -517 
(2000).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 416.660(2) 
(Michie 1992). 
The date of taking, which is the 
earlier of: 
(1) Date the condemnor takes the 
land. 
(2) Date of compensation trial. 
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 19:9(A), :14, :153 
(West 1979). 
Not clear, but three possibilities: 
(1) Time before condemnor 
proposed the taking. § 19:9(A). 
(2) Time of taking. § 19:14 
(3) Time condemnor deposited 
estimated compensation into 
court registry. § 19:153. 
Date of trial if determining 
damage to remainder in partial 
taking and if condemnor is port 
authority, state university, or a 
state department of public works. 
§ 19:153. 
Maine [Maine’s eminent 
domain code sections 
are disbursed 
throughout the entire 
code.] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., 
REAL PROP. § 12-
103 (1996). 
The earlier of: 
(1) Date of taking. 
(2) Date of trial. 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 79, § 12 
(West 1993). 
Time before recording of taking 
order. 
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Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 213.70, sec. 
20(3) (West 1998). 
Date of filing. 
Minnesota [MINN. STAT. 
§§ 117.011–.57 
(1997 & Supp. 
2002).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 11-27-19 (1972). 
Date of filing complaint. 
Missouri [MO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 523.010–.215 
(2002).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 70-30-302 (2001). 
Date of summons. 
Nebraska [NEB. REV. STAT. 
§§ 76-701 to -726 
(1996).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. 
37.120(1) (2001). 
Two options: 
(1) Date of first service of 
summons. 
(2) Date trial commences if trial 
begins more than two years after 
first service of summons and the 
delay was primarily caused by 
condemnor or court backlog. 
New 
Hampshire 
[N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 498-A:1 to 
:31 (1997 & Supp. 
2002).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
New Jersey 
continued 
N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 20:3-30 (West 
1997). 
The earliest of: 
(1) Date of possession by 
condemnor. 
(2) Date condemnation action 
commenced. 
(3) Date that condemnor takes 
action that “substantially affects” 
the condemnee’s use and 
enjoyment of the property. 
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New Jersey   (4) Date of blight declaration by 
governing body if pursuant to a 
planning board report, or, in the 
case of a property on the 
abandoned property list and 
where there is no blight 
declaration, the date of the 
expiration of the condemnee’s 
right to appeal the property’s 
inclusion on the abandoned 
property list.  
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 42A-1-24(A) 
(Michie 1994); see 
also id. § 42-2-15(A). 
Date of filing petition. 
New York [N.Y. EM. DOM. 
PROC. LAW §§ 101-
709 (McKinney 1979 
& Supp. 1998).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
North 
Carolina 
N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 40A-63 (2002). 
Time “immediately prior” to 
filing of petition or complaint. 
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 32-15-23 (1996). 
Date of taking. 
Ohio [OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 163.01–.62 
(Anderson 2001 & 
Supp. 2001).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Oklahoma [OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 27, §§ 1–16 
(West 1997 & Supp. 
2002).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Oregon [OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 35.205–.415 
(2001).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Pennsylvania 26 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 1-602(a) (1997). 
Time immediately before and 
immediately after partial taking. 
No specific valuation date for 
total takings. 
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Rhode Island [R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§§ 37-6-1 to -6.1-12 
(1997 & Supp. 
2001).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
South 
Carolina 
S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 28-2-440 (Law. 
Co-op. 1991). 
Date of filing condemnation 
notice. 
South Dakota [S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 21-35-1 to 
-30 (Michie 1987 & 
Supp. 2002).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Tennessee [TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 29-16-101 to 17-
1202 (2000 & Supp. 
2001).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Texas TEX. PROP. CODE 
ANN. § 21.042(b) 
(Vernon 2000). 
Time of the special 
commissioners’ hearing. 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-34-11 (1996). 
Date of service of summons. 
Vermont [VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
24, §§ 2805–2813 
(1992 & Supp. 
2002).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 25-46.3 (Michie 
2000). 
The earlier of: 
(1) Date of lawful taking. 
(2) Date condemnor filed 
petition. 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 8.04.092, 
8.12.190(1) (1992). 
(1) Date of trial order granting 
the condemnor immediate 
possession if condemnor is state 
entity. 
(2) Date of trial if condemnor is 
city. 
No specific valuation date statute 
that governs county government 
condemnations. 
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West Virginia [W. VA. CODE 
§§ 54-1-1 to -2-21 
(2000 & Supp. 
2002).] 
No specific valuation date statute. 




(1) Date of recording of award in 
county register’s office after 
condemnor paid award if in a 
condemnation action for sewers 
or transportation. 
(2) Date of filing of lis pendens if 
in a condemnation action for 
purposes other than 
transportation. 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1-26-703 (Michie 
2001). 
Date that condemnation action 
commenced. 
 
Note on Uniform Eminent Domain Code: The National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Eminent 
Domain Code (“UEDC”) in 1974. See NOVAK ET AL., supra note 63, 
§ 16.3, at 131 (1994). “Alabama is the only state to substantially adopt this 
code, effective as of January 1, 1986.” Id. The UEDC contains a valuation 
date provision that sets the valuation date at either the date on which a 
plaintiff first makes a deposit or the date on which trial commences, 
whichever comes first. Id. § 16.5, at 133. 
 
